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Country-level corruption and accounting choice: research & development 





International Accounting Standard 38 Intangible Asset  mandates that development costs 
must be capitalized if certain conditions specified n the standard are met. However, this 
requires managerial judgement and hence may be subjct to opportunism. Corruption is a 
permeable informal country characteristic that penetrat s firms’ behaviour, influencing 
corporate misconduct. We conjecture that an environment with high corruption facilitates 
management in their justification of meeting the capitalization criteria of assets that should 
have been expensed, either partly or entirely. Effectiv ly, these capitalized assets will not 
generate the future economic benefits implicitly conveyed by their recognition. This 
recognition, however, sends positive (albeit distorted) market signals for future earnings and 
increases current year reported earnings. We find that there is a positive relation between 
country-level corruption and the amount of development costs capitalized in a given year. 
Moreover, the higher the levels of country corruption, the lower the contribution of 
capitalized development costs in a given year to fuure profitability. Finally, this association 
is moderated by companies’ levels of internationalization. 
 






















Companies invest in research and development (hereaft r R&D) to compete in continuously 
evolving business environments. R&D investments have  long-term effect on earnings, 
facilitate corporate growth and long-term sustainability (Dugan, McEldowney, Turner, & 
Wheatley, 2016) as well as value creation (e.g. Chan, L konishok, & Sougiannis, 2001; Duqi, 
Jaafar, & Torluccio, 2015; Sougiannis, 1994). Along these lines, some argue that the most 
valuable corporate assets are created through R&D (Boujelben & Fedhila, 2011).  
Under International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS), International 
Accounting Standard (hereafter IAS) 38 Intangible Assets sets out a number of restrictive 
conditions for the capitalization of development costs. Hence, one would expect that only 
those development expenditures from R&D projects which are highly likely to be successful 
are capitalized and in doing so convey future value creation (Chen, Gavious, & Lev, 2016). 
However, the application of these conditions requires managers to exercise judgement over 
proprietary and subjective information. Thus, the capitalization decision is open to 
managerial discretion, leading to potential earnings management, such that its reliability and 
faithful representation can be questioned (Cazavan-Jeny, Jeanjean, & Joos, 2011; Dinh, 
Kang, & Schultze, 2016). This paper responds to the call from Hoque and Monem (2016) to 
address the potential link between accounting and corruption and investigates the extent to 
which corruption is associated with the capitalization of R&D under IFRS. 
Being a permeable and informal country characteristic, corruption is pervasive in 
individuals’ and companies’ day to day business activities and dealings (Rodriguez, 
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005) with negative consequences. Corruption adversely impacts the 
allocation of resources with a negative effect on the level of investment and economic growth 
(Bryant & Javalgi, 2015; Voyer & Beamish, 2004). At a business level, aggregate measures 














This includes information transparency (Dirienzo, Das, Cort, & Burbridge, 2007), perceived 
levels of accounting and audit quality amongst busine s people (Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge, 
& Stephens, 2010), earnings management (Lourenço, Rathke, Santana, & Branco, 2018), and 
earnings opacity (Picur, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004).  
We focus on the capitalization of development costs, an important IFRS-specific 
accounting treatment, which is at the heart of the accounting choice literature (Kreß, Eierle, 
and Tsalavoutas, 2019). We also draw on business and m agement literature and conjecture 
that in countries with high levels of corruption, managers can exploit the features of such an 
environment and capitalize development costs which ordinarily should have been expensed 
(Hypothesis 1). In this way, managers appear as signaling their inside information about the 
firm’s future R&D related income generation. However, in reality, they provide an inflated 
signal about such future economic benefits. Confirmation of this distorted signal will be 
evidenced if the amounts capitalized in a given year have a lower contribution to future 
earnings compared to those assets recognized by firms in countries with lower levels of 
corruption (Hypothesis 2).  
Building on these two hypotheses, we next consider whether a firms’ internationalization 
level moderates the association between corruption and the level of capitalized development 
costs. As firms become more international, the trait of domestic corruption may subside as it 
becomes more exposed to international norms (Reid, 1983). Prior literature shows that 
internationalization positively influences management attitudes towards stewardship and 
accountability (Murtha, Lenway, & Bagozzi, 1998; Segaro, Larimo, & Jones, 2014), 
compared to more domestically-orientated firms (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007) and serves to 
lessen the effect of domestic corruption (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003). Thus, the more 
international a firm is, the weaker will be the association between domestic corruption and 














role of corruption in the association between capitalized costs and future earnings should be 
weaker for those firms that are more international compared to more domestically-orientated 
firms (Hypothesis 4). 
To test our hypotheses, we employ a longitudinal sample of almost 3,200 firm-year 
observations, across 20 countries, which were mandated to adopt IFRS in 2005.  Our findings 
show the following. First, after controlling for various firm and other country institutional 
characteristics, we find a positive relation between country-level corruption and the amount 
of development costs capitalized. Further, we find that capitalized amounts in a given year 
contribute materially to future earnings. However, the higher the level of corruption, the 
lower the association of the capitalized development costs to future profitability, compared to 
countries with lower levels of corruption. Additionally, in more international companies, the 
association between the amount of capitalized development costs and domestic corruption is 
less pronounced as compared to those companies that are more domestically orientated. 
Finally, the contribution of capitalized development costs to future profitability is negatively 
associated with the level of domestic corruption only i  less international firms.  
In additional analyses, we explore whether firms that capitalize development costs in 
countries with lower levels of corruption earn superior abnormal returns relative to those in 
countries with higher levels of corruption. Our result  show that, in the short-term (i.e., one 
year ahead), firms in both sub-samples exhibit similar and non-significant abnormal returns. 
However, we find that, in the long term (i.e., five y ars ahead), capitalizing firms in 
countries with lower levels of corruption do earn superior stock returns relative to firms in 
countries with higher levels of corruption. This is consistent with the evidence that the 
capitalized amounts in countries with higher levels of corruption have lower contribution to 
future earnings in the long-run. Thus, stock-market par icipants price capitalizers differently 














participants appear unable to discern the benefits as ociated with the amounts of 
development costs capitalized in the short-term. This is corrected in the longer term as more 
information becomes available and is not surprising as it takes time for the benefits of R&D 
investments to unravel (Nadiri & Prucha, 1996; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996).   
By examining the association between corruption and capitalized development costs and 
the capitalized development costs’ respective contribution to future firm earnings, we 
contribute to the literature as follows. Firstly, we respond to Shah, Liang, and Akbar (2013 p. 
168) who call for ‘analysis regarding capitalizing R&D expenditures’. Only one single 
country-study examines the determinants of R&D capitalization under IFRS (i.e., Dinh et al., 
2016) and neither corruption nor internationalization as country- and firm-level contextual 
factors respectively were considered. Unlike our research which employs an international 
dataset, that study is restricted to Germany, and thus its findings are country specific and do 
not shed light on the potential disparity of accounting and managerial choice in a cross-
country context. Second, whilst Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011) and Ahmed and Falk (2006) 
provide mixed evidence regarding the relationship between capitalized development costs 
and a firm’s future earnings, these are again single country studies (France and Australia, 
respectively) and significantly both focus on pre-IFRS adoption. Third, by drawing on 
corruption as a possible factor associated with accounting choice, we provide one hitherto 
unexamined aspect of that analysis. In doing so, we specifically address the call by Houqe 
and Monem (2016, p. 3) who note that ‘literature linking corruption with accounting is 
sparse’. Fourth, we contribute to the literature which examines the association between R&D 
expenditure and subsequent stock returns (e.g. Duqi, Jaafar, & Torluccio, 2015; Chambers, 
Jennings, & Thomson, 2002; Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis, 2001; Lev & Sougiannis, 
1996) by considering the market returns earned by firms which capitalize R&D expenditure. 














IFRS earn excess stock returns and this evidence is provided across sub-samples of countries 
with high versus low levels of corruption. Finally, we provide empirical findings in support 
of Ball (2006), Nobes (2006), Weetman (2006) and Zeff (2007) suggesting that country 
specific characteristics result in an uneven application of IFRS worldwide, and arguably, with 
adverse effects on the comparability of financial st tements. Specifically, we demonstrate that 
a highly pervasive country characteristic affects managers’ decision making with regards to 
the recognition of intangible assets. Even though formal institutional mechanisms such as 
enforcement and monitoring powers are in place, corruption still permeates accounting 
choices and thus raises concerns regarding the resultant reliability of information in 
companies’ financial statements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, discusses the relevant 
literature and the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample selection process 
and the methods employed. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 
5 discusses the sensitivity analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper by also discussing 
limitations and avenues for further research. 
 
2. Background, literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 R&D reporting under IFRS 
Since 2005, all publicly traded firms in the European Union (EU) need to report consolidated 
financial statements under IFRS.1 In line with this development, many countries outside the 
EU either adopted IFRS or converged their national st ndards to IFRS. IAS 38 is the 
standard governing the accounting treatment of intangible assets. IAS 38 requires the 
capitalization of development expenditures which meet a specific set of criteria. In order to 
capitalize the development costs a company should assess: the technical feasibility of the 
                                                 
1 In some jurisdictions (e.g. Greece and Italy) this requirement applied also to listed companies which 














intangible asset; the intention to complete the asst and with the ability to sell (or use) it; the 
availability of resources, technical or financial, to complete it; the ability to reliably measure 
the expenditure and the ability to justify that theasset will generate future economic benefits 
(paragraph 57). 
If these conditions are met, a company must then capitalize development expenditure. 
However, in establishing whether all these criteria are met, there is, necessarily, reliance on 
managerial judgement and hence discretion over the capitalization decision 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010, p. 7).  Effectively, if the company decides that one of the 
conditions is not met, then it must expense the relvant cost incurred. Alternatively, and 
consistent with an earnings management and noisy signalling approach (Ahmed & Falk, 
2006, 2009; Cazavan-Jeny & Jeanjean, 2006; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; Ciftci, 2010; Dinh 
et al., 2016; Markarian, Pozza, & Prencipe, 2008; Prencipe, Markarian, & Pozza, 2008), a 
company may judge that all of the conditions have been met and hence capitalize 
development costs which ordinarily should have been xpensed and may not generate the 
future economic benefits signalled by their capitalization.  
 
2.2 The R&D capitalization debate and academic evidence 
The accounting treatment of R&D has been a controversial issue among standards setters, 
financial statement preparers and users as well as ac demics. In contrast to IAS 38, under US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (hereafter SFAS) 2), all R&D costs are expensed. One of the reasons behind this 
differential treatment are the concerns of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
regarding the uncertainty of future benefits expected from the capitalized assets. 
Additionally, they are concerned that management may use their discretion to capitalize 














Healy & Wahlen, 1999). This is why Ahmed and Falk (2006 p. 234) conclude that, standard 
setters, such as FASB, are concerned that ‘the cost of possible misstatement to exceed the 
benefits of signalling’ (and thus mandate expensing all R&D costs as a result).2 However, 
Amir, Guan, and Livne (2007) conclude that uniform expensing of R&D costs is ‘overly 
conservative’ (p. 245). 
In summary, within this debate, two opposing views dominate. On the one hand, 
development costs effectively constitute investments which will result in future economic 
benefits and as a result they should be capitalized (i. ., not expensed) to recognize their 
current value to the business and to provide a signal for future earnings arising from 
successful development expenditure (Lev, Nissim, & Thomas, 2008). On the other hand, 
capitalization can effectively be used as an earnings management vehicle (Dinh et al., 2016; 
Ciftci, 2010).  
In relation to signalling, there is mixed evidence within the literature on the link between 
capitalization and future earnings. For instance, in relation to French companies in the pre-
IFRS period in which firms were permitted to capitalize some research and development 
costs under certain conditions, Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2006) find a significant and 
negative relationship of total capitalized development costs and share price. They explain this 
surprising finding as ‘…an indication that the stand rd is [was] not properly applied by 
French managers’ (p. 39) stemming from weak legal enforcement in France (with reference 
to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998)). This is consistent with the view 
that managers are more likely to take a more opportunistic approach to capitalization. 
Further, Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011), again in the Fr nch pre-IFRS context, find that 
capitalized development costs in a given year are generally associated with a negative or 
                                                 
2 Under US GAAP, the only exception to this relates o software development (SD) costs which can be 















neutral impact on future performance (indicative of aggressive accounting), and hence 
inconsistent with a genuine signaling effect.  
In contrast, Ahmed and Falk (2006) in an Australian pre-IFRS context, where companies 
were permitted to capitalize research and development costs under certain conditions find 
that, ‘R&D capitalized expenditure [in a given year] is positively and significantly associated 
with the firm’s future earnings’ (p. 231). Thus, they argue that managers are able ‘to credibly 
signal their superior information by either capitalizing successful R&D investment or 
expensing unsuccessful R&D investment’ (p. 259). The value relevance of capitalized 
development cost, and hence the signalling of manageri l information, is also noted by Shah 
et al. (2013) using UK data covering pre and post IFRS adoption. They find that total 
capitalized development costs are value relevant and conclude ‘that investors perceive the 
capitalization of R&D to be related to successful R&D projects’ (ibid, p. 168) (and see 
Oswald & Zarowin, 2007; Tsoligkas & Tsalavoutas, 2011).  
With respect to the potential manipulation of capitlization associated with aggressive 
reporting or earnings management, whilst much of the prior literature is based upon national 
GAAP rather than IFRS, consistent findings have been r ported. Overall, managers 
capitalize development costs to meet or beat earnings thresholds/targets or to avoid reporting 
losses (Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011) or as forming part of earnings management for earnings 
smoothing (Markarian et al., 2008 in relation to Italian companies). Finally, Dinh et al. 
(2016), in their study on Germany, which covers companies reporting under IFRS, found 
that ‘pressure to beat past year’s earnings and analysts’ forecast of earnings, increases the 
probability of a firm capitalizing R&D in the current period. This evidence is in line with the 
notion of firms opportunistically managing earnings via R&D capitalization’ (p. 3).  
Given that these are single country studies, they do not allow for the consideration of 














managers’ decision and behaviour towards capitalizaion of development costs. We 
conjecture that, after controlling for incentives to meet earnings thresholds and other 
institutional factors (such as enforcement and external monitoring), corruption facilitates 
aggressive capitalization. This informal contextual mechanism enables managers to justify 
capitalization of development costs that do not necessarily meet the capitalization criteria, 
and will subsequently contribute less to future earnings.  
 
2.3 Country-level corruption and its pervasiveness on business practices  
Corruption is described as ‘…an abuse of power and a deviance from the regular duties of 
individual actors’ (Aßländer, 2017, p. 210). Where corruption is prevalent, business cheating 
and scandals are merely one manifestation of a much broader and more insidious acceptance 
of corruption within society (Zuckerman, 2006, cited in Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & 
Trevino, 2008). In such settings, corruption is collectively ‘normalized’ (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003) leading to a gradual erosion of moral agency over time (Ashforth et al., 2008; Brief, 
Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008). Within a corrupt society, 
Aßländer (2017, p. 213) states that corruption is not just a phenomenon of the governmental 
sector (i.e., a private-to-public phenomenon) but has increasingly become a phenomenon in 
private-to-private business relations (Rodriguez et al., 2005), even among more developed 
economies with stronger governmental regulations and oversight mechanisms in place. 
Spence (2017, p. 456) outlines five features that cracterise corruption: possession of 
power, a disposition to exercise that power, an opportunity to exercise that power, invisibility 
or concealment, and self-regarding gain. Within a corrupt political-economic system, issues 
such as bribery and personal favours are common place, referred to as ‘crony capitalism’ 














accrues to the agent or to a group, as a result of his or the group’s actions (Spence 2017, p. 
456).  
The business ethics literature distinguishes between venal and institutional corruption 
(Lessig, 2011, p. 233-235). Venal corruption is defined as ‘…the illegal use of public 
resources for private gain, especially by government bureaucrats who trade favours and 
contracts with private interests for money or some other kind of benefit or politicians who 
simply raid public treasuries’ (Youngdahl, 2017, p. 279). Institutional corruption, on the other 
hand, is often subtler. Although ‘generally not techni ally illegal, this form of corruption has 
been described as a systemic ‘gaming’ to subvert th intent of society’s rules by the use of 
means that are technically legal’ (Youngdahl, 2017, p. 280). Hence, in a business context, 
firms may violate private sector standards and codes of conduct. This is operationalised 
through a sixth condition that characterises corruption: ‘…breach of a socially pre-established 
and widely acknowledged fiduciary relationship of trust that exists between the corrupt 
person or group and the person or group(s) that are h med in some way by the corrupt 
actions’ (Spence, 2017, p. 458). This may include companies misinforming shareholders and 
other stakeholders such as customers and employees. A k y feature of institutional corruption 
is that managers are perceived as ‘active rationalisers’ or, in extreme cases, ‘guilty 
perpetrators’ (c.f., Zyglidopoulos & Flemming, 2008) and exploit the ‘opportunities’ arising 
in the business environment within which they operate.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses development  
A combination of venal and institutional corruption e ables managers to exploit such an 
external environment and provide evidence to auditors and other stakeholders that prima 
facie justifies capitalization of development costs which ordinarily should have been partly or 














number of illustrative examples to illustrate how managers may justify capitalization of costs 
in meeting the criteria outlined in IAS 38. 
In relation to the availability of resources, where high institutional and venal corruption 
exist, the business environment is conducive to the ability to secure asset-based financing 
through non-arm’s length relationships with providers of debt. For example, Fan, Rui, and 
Zhao (2008) find that politically connected or bribing firms in China have a comparative 
advantage in obtaining access to debt, and in particular long-term debt. A more extreme form 
of this is when political officials require state-owned banks and private banks to make large 
loans or refinancing to businesses, which may ordina ily fail lending conditions. Further, 
politicians and regulators within the country may even encourage the lending cycles to 
continue with the help of state bailouts. Moreover, political officials may assign natural 
resources, development licenses and contracts to their associates. These would allow 
companies to access the necessary technical or otheresources needed for a project’s 
completion. In exchange of these favours (contracts, li ences, loans), associates often agree to 
hire and promote people recommended by the political officials (see Nielsen, 2017, p. 121-
122 for more details). Conveniently, this background allows companies to evidence the 
availability of human, financial and/or other resources required for the successful completion 
of the project.  
In relation to the ability to sell (or use) the asset, this could be evidenced with assurances 
about its quality and appropriateness of its specificat on. Corrupt relationships between 
contractors and supervisory authorities would allow the former to persuade the latter to 
approve or overlook poor quality workmanship and materi ls or to ignore safety breaches. 
For instance, it is commonly reported that counterfeit drugs and substandard medical devices 
enter the healthcare system in environments where inspection and registration procedures by 














payments (see discussion in Stepurko, Pavlova, & Groot, 2017, (p. 319) and Kohler & 
Ovtcharenko, 2013). 
Similarly, ‘slotting fees’ and ‘introductory allowances’ have been criticised as an abuse 
of market power and a kind of institutional bribery given that such payments are not illegal 
(Murphy, Laczniak, Bowie, & Klein, 2005, p. 128). Aßländer & Storchevoy (2017, p. 485) 
refer to these as ‘…a hidden form of corruption’. I an environment with high levels of such 
institutional corruption at the private-to-private l vel, these ‘fees’ facilitate advantageous 
market positioning of products, which may be of inferior quality (White, Troy, & Gerlich, 
2000) but nonetheless help managers demonstrate future product sales and thus earnings 
potential.  
Stemming from this, evidencing future economic benefits can be more readily 
manipulated in an institutionally corrupt environment via two additional mechanisms. First, 
through engaging with dubious marketing practices, companies effectively misinform 
customers about product probity as well as supporting an artificial level of demand. For 
example, in the media industry, ‘cash for comment’ involves false endorsements of products 
(Spence, 2017, p. 464).3 In the pharmaceutical sector, ‘clinical trials have often be found to 
be fabricated, exaggerated or negative results hidden’ (Martinez, Kholer, & McAlister, 2017, 
p. 335; with reference to Lexchin, 2012).4 Further, a large proportion of pharmaceuticals 
companies spend more on marketing than on research and development (Olson, 2015). These 
marketing costs include tangible gifts including, sponsorship, consultancy contracts, as well 
as intangible gifts such as conferences in vacation destinations. The industry argues that these 
marketing activities help with the dissemination of information about new drugs (Martinez et 
                                                 
3 A well-known example is the strategy employed in Australia by a PR firm advocating an anti-obesity drug 
for its client, Abbott Australasia, who overstated he medical support for the drug (see Spence, 2017: 470-473 
for a detailed discussion of the case). 
4 For example, a study reported that 94% of Randomised Control Tests results dealing with antidepressant  
where framed in a way that suggested positive results. An analysis of the underlying trials by food and drug 















al., 2017, p. 336). Indirectly, this creates demand. Because of this, from an accounting 
perspective, the related costs are classified as helth ducation or in fact R&D expenditures 
(Martinez et al., 2017, p. 336), although the value of this information is questionable (Avorn, 
2015), especially in cases where the information is m leading regarding the efficacy and 
safety of the drug promoted (Fischer, 2014).  
The second mechanism is through illicit payments to government officials to secure 
contracts or engagement with local agents and sub-contractors who place products from 
preferential suppliers (with kick-backs). For example, Ferrostaal paid about a billion euros in 
bribes to a large number of Greek officials in relation to a contract for submarine building 
and delivery.5 Other examples include Siemens which was found to have made ‘more than 
2.3 billion euros of suspicious payments for securing oversees contracts in China, Russia, 
Argentina, Israel, Greece, Iraq and Venezuela’ (Aßländer, 2017, p. 216, with reference to 
Boehme & Murphy, 2007; Shuburt & Miller, 2008). Finally, the Cyprus Ministry of Health 
were found in 2009 of tailoring tenders for radiotherapy equipment in favour a selected 
company. Similar to the introduction of lower quality products in the market via slotting fees, 
many of these cases involved the promotion of deficient products.6 
Providing evidence that substantiates meeting the remaining three conditions for 
capitalization primarily relies on the management’s judgement and the company’s internal 
information. Hence, the role of independent audit and ppropriate verification becomes more 
onerous. However, auditors have limited knowledge of the nature, extent, and technical 
features of their client’s R&D activities. Thus, to become more informed, auditors rely on 
external experts and on the assurances of the management team (Cheng, Lu, & Kuo, 2016).  
Nevertheless, in a corrupt environment, the role, integrity and quality of audit 
performance can fall short of the expected standards, by not robustly challenging the 
                                                 
5 A summary of this case can be found at the blog of Tufts University: 
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/the-greek-submarine-scandal/ 














management so as to maintain a long-lasting audit rela ionship and income (through fees). 
Under such condition, institutional corruption prevails and this subverts norms of expected 
sector standards and impairs the auditor’s fiduciary duty as they become more captured by 
management (c.f., Levitt, 2000). This can be exacerbat d especially if higher fees are paid as 
a result of capitalization (see the findings of Cheng t al., 2016 and Kreß et al., 2019). This is 
why Youngdahl (2017, p. 279) argues that auditors ‘…have too often served as handmaidens 
of corruption’. Given the embeddedness of corruption within a society (Rodriguez et al., 
2005), the external information auditors may require could be biased or unreliable and hence 
provide false assurance (see examples of flawed clinica  trial data or corruption in the media 
industry discussed earlier). In line with this, it is not surprising that Malagueño et al. (2010) 
find that perceived auditing quality is negatively related to the level of corruption.  
Based upon the preceding discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between country-level corruption and the amount of 
development costs capitalized. 
 
Ceteris paribus, the amounts capitalized should generate economic benefits in the future, 
translated into higher future earnings streams. Effectively, if indeed the amount capitalized 
delivers higher benefits from the cost values that will be expensed in the income statement 
via amortization, the effect in the income statement will not be the same – it will be higher.7 
On this basis, the capitalized development costs which should ordinarily be capitalized to a 
lesser extent or expensed entirely, would not deliver as high as signalled future earnings.  
Relating to H1, in environments where corruption prevails, companies do not operate 
efficiently and according to the principles most consistent with fair, market-based outcomes 
(Rodriguez, 2017, p. 174-175). More specifically, Tanzi (1998) discusses how corruption 
might skew the allocation of critical resources and even the acquisition of human capital 
                                                 
7 IAS 38 permits the revaluation model but evidence suggests that companies do not apply it (see Tsalavout s 














towards unproductive activities (Rodriguez, 2017, p. 153). Concern regarding unproductive 
activities in corrupt environments has also been found in prior accounting and finance 
literature (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991). For instance, stemming from H1, the 
preferential and sub-optimal allocation of resources and contracts to cronies (Nielsen, 2017, 
p. 120; Edwards, Bowen, & Cattell, 2017: 395) and the introduction and marketing of ‘low 
quality’ products and services in more corrupt busine s environments (c.f., Stepurko et al., 
2017, p. 319; Kohler & Ovtcharenko, 2013) impairs the creation of longer-term benefits, and 
thus earnings for the firm. In addition, the people hired as an exchange of favours are 
frequently ‘ghost employees’ and often cannot be fir d. They may also not have necessarily 
the technical skills required for the job (c.f., Nielsen, 2017, p. 122), which would again 
depress future earnings compared to that signalled by capitalization. Indeed, future benefits 
will further dissipate if the corrupt contracts are exposed in the longer term.8 In line with this, 
Shakantu (2006) argues that direct and indirect costs through corruption become significantly 
higher, leading to lower returns on investment. 
On that basis, we conjecture that the association between development costs capitalized 
in a given year and cumulative future earnings in the long-run would not be as high for firms 
in countries with higher corruption levels. Hence, w  test the following hypothesis:   
H2. The higher the corruption in a country, the lower the association of the capitalized 
development costs to future profitability.  
 
We are primarily interested in the association betwe n corruption and capitalization of 
development costs (H1) and the moderating role of corruption in the relationship between 
capitalized development costs and future earnings (H2). However, these relationships may be 
moderated by the extent to which a particular firm is exposed to foreign norms and 
behaviours. Thus, we are posing that the association between domestic corruption and this 
                                                 
8 An example of these happening is the Ferrostaal case. In fact, the reputation of the company was severely 














discretionary financial reporting choice should diminish as firms become more international. 
Following on from this, the influence of corruption upon the association between capitalized 
development costs and future profitability will be weaker in more international firms as 
compared to less international firms. The rationale of these additional hypotheses is as 
follows.  
One of the strategic choices that firms undertake is the internationalization of their 
business activity. Reid (1983) highlights the importance of export market characteristics, 
such as economic and social norms, becoming recognized and part of a firm’s decision-
making processes. As such, firms will adapt and adopt an increasingly multi-market centred, 
as opposed to domestic, approach to international business (see also Johanson and Vahlne's 
(1990) process model of internationalization ). Moreover, Murtha et al. (1998) and Segaro et 
al. (2014) argue that managerial thinking and attitudes towards issues such as accountability 
and global values are critical for strategic change associated with internationalization. 
Further, the resource diversity of internationalization, compared to the domestic 
environment, positively influences management attitudes and mindsets in a global 
environment (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007; O'Grady & Lane, 1996). From this, it derives that the 
more international the firm is, the more long term-orientation and stronger elements of 
stewardship it has (Murtha et al., 1998; Segaro et al., 2014). 
With regard to corruption in particular, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) assert that as 
international trade augments international norms, the effect of corruption is reduced on those 
involved with trade, consistent with a ‘significant i verse relationship between international 
trade and corruption levels’ (p. 765). From the foregoing, it follows that the more 
international a firm becomes, compared to those more domestic firms, the less it will be 














These arguments are also informed by the evidence in the accounting literature which 
provide wider evidence that the impact of country-level corruption and managerial 
opportunism at a firm-level is reduced through inter ationalization. For example, Dauth, 
Pronobis, and Schmid (2017, p. 71) provide evidence that, ‘top management 
internationalization mitigates the level of managerial discretion in financial reporting’. 
Additionally, Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008) argue that if a domestic firm derives 
most of its revenues from overseas operations, or if the firm is cross-listed, then the firm ‘is 
less likely affected by domestic norms’ (p. 361) than other, less internationally-oriented 
firms.  
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) and Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) employ cross-listing 
as a measure of internationalization and find that cross-listed firms have better, more 
transparent, information environments and would appe r to be less aggressive in their 
reporting. Moreover, ‘multinationals tend to carry out less income-increasing earnings 
management than domestic firms’ (Prencipe, 2012, p. 693). This is particularly relevant to 
our context given that capitalization of development costs, instead of expensing them, results 
in increased reporting earnings in a given year. 
From the foregoing, we would argue that companies with an international focus are less 
driven by local factors, and as a result, the influence of domestic corruption would diminish. 
Thus, we hypothesise that the association between corruption and the amount of capitalized 
development costs would be weaker for those companies that are more international.  
H3. The positive relation between country-level corruption and the amount of 
development capitalized is stronger in firms with lower levels of internationalization 
compared to firms with higher levels of internationalization.  
 
From this and on reflection of H2, it derives that the expected positive influence of 














corruption when the company is less international. Thus, we also test the following 
hypothesis: 
H4. The influence of corruption upon the association of the capitalized development costs 
and future profitability is stronger in firms with lower levels of internationalization 
compared to firms with higher levels of internationalization  
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample selection process 
Table 1 (Panel A) reports the sample selection process. The starting point is the countries that 
adopted IFRS on a mandatory basis in 2005, as reported in Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 
(2008).9 We obtain data from Worldscope/Datastream and include all companies in the 
research lists of dead and active firms constructed by Datastream for each country in our 
sample. To avoid double counting, firms that are cross-listed in more than one market are 
included in our sample once, based only on the country of primary listing. In addition, we 
eliminate financial instruments that are not classified as equity.10 The sample period starts in 
2006 and ends in 2010 because we require five years of data subsequent to that (i.e., 2011-
2015) to measure subsequent future performance (hypot eses H2 and H4). Similarly to 
Schleicher, Tahoun, and Walker (2010) and Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2013), we 
eliminate all firm-year observations if the Worldscope item ‘accounting standards followed’ 
(WC07536) is missing or returns a non-IFRS related co e for the current year or subsequent 
five years. We also exclude the first year of IFRS adoption to reduce the potential for any 
misreporting due to low familiarity with IFRS at the time. Further, we drop firms in the Oil & 
                                                 
9 We do not consider voluntary adopters to alleviate possible bias introduced from firm specific reasons to 
adopt IFRS. We also exclude Switzerland and Venezuela which are included in Daske et al. (2008). 
Switzerland did not implement IFRS at that time; it gave companies the option to adopt IFRS or US GAAP 
instead. Venezuela is excluded due to it being an eco omy with hyper-inflation and as such only fully adopted 
IFRS in 2008 with some modifications for inflation. 














Gas industry due to extraction costs, which could be classified as development costs.11 From 
that point, we follow prior literature (e.g., Chen t al., 2017; Cazavan-Jenny et al., 2011, Dinh 
et al., 2016), and maintain firms which are R&D active, i.e., we exclude firm-year 
observations which do not report either R&D expense or R&D asset, where both the R&D 
asset and R&D expense are zero, and firm-year observations where either the R&D asset or 
R&D expense are negative (the latter are obvious errors in the database).12 Following García 
Lara, García Osma, & Mora (2005), we also exclude firms with accounting periods of more 
than 380 or less than 350 days and firm-year observations with insufficient data. 
Subsequently, the sample is restricted due to data unavailability for various variables needed 
for our tests. This process results in our sample consisting of 3,186 firm-year observations 
corresponding to 1,077 firms, across 20 countries. We classify firm-year observations as a 
capitalizer if a company capitalizes some or all of the R&D expenditure during the year, 
otherwise we consider the company as an expenser. In total, we have 1,491 capitalizers and 
1,695 expensers.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Panels B and C of Table 1 show the sample distribution by industry classification using 
ICB Super Sector (ICB Level 1) and country, respectiv ly. We observe a variation of our 
sample firms across industries, with most of the firms being from the Industrials (997), 
Consumer Goods (563), Technology (553), Health Care (471), and Basic Materials (333) 
industry sectors. Moreover, there is also a variation of the sample observations across 
countries (e.g., UK (768), Germany (546), France (367), Australia (264), Sweden (230), 
Finland (212), Italy (165)).    
                                                 
11 These firms are permitted but not required to capitalize some exploration and extraction costs. The treatment 
of these costs is governed by IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources. We exclude these 
firms to avoid introduction of any biases in our analyses given that capitalization of such costs is voluntary, 
their treatment is governed by a standard other than IAS 38 and that they have a distinct nature. 
12 Observations with missing R&D expense or R&D asset have been replaced with zero as this is common in 
this stream of literature. Our sample, thus, includes those firm-year observations reporting either a non-zero 














3.2 Corruption as a determinant of development costs capitalized (H1 & H3) 
Prior literature models the capitalization of R&D as  function of a firm’s life cycle and 
whether the firm meets the conditions for capitalization of development costs in a given year 
(Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; Dinh et al., 2016; Markarian et al., 2008; Oswald, 2008; Oswald 
& Zarowin, 2007; Tutticci, Krishnan, & Percy, 2007; Ahmed & Falk, 2006).13 Informed by 
the research designs in this literature, we first te H1 (i.e., the association between corruption 
and the amount of R&D capitalized), by estimating the following left censored Tobit model: 
RDCap=b0 + b1Corruption + b2∑Controls + Industry fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ε   (1) 
where, RDCap is the amount of R&D capitalized during the year, scaled by market value of 
equity;14  Corruption is the measure of country-level corruption. Our measure of corruption is 
based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) calcul ted from Transparency International 
(TI) and has been extensively used by prior literature as a proxy for corruption in a country 
(e.g. DeBacker, Heim, & Tran, 2015; Liu, 2016; Mazzi, Slack, & Tsalavoutas, 2018).15 CPI is 
calculated annually and scores countries based on the perceived level of corruption among 
public officials and politicians. Given that the index captures the informed views of analysts, 
businesspeople and other experts in countries around the world, it proxies for pervasiveness 
of corruption in individuals’ and companies’ day to day business activities and dealings 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005). TI records countries which are less corrupt as top scorers. Therefore, 
a higher CPI rank indicates a less corrupt country and vice versa. To assist the interpretation 
of our findings, we construct Corruption as the difference between the highest possible CPI 
                                                 
13 Although we briefly outline the reasoning for the inclusion of the various variables in our model, more 
details on the theoretical justifications for the inclusion of the control variables can be found in: Cazavan-Jeny 
et al., 2011; Dinh et al., 2016; Markarian et al., 2008; Oswald, 2008; Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; Tutticci et 
al., 2007; Ahmed and Falk, 2006. 
14 We scale by market value so that we retain consistency with the scale used in the regression model 
examining the future economic benefits (see below). In that model, the dependent variable, sum of future 
earnings, is also scaled by market values which in effect is an average forward looking EPS measure.  
15 The CPI is a combination of polls drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable 
institutions. It is calculated each year and scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are se n to be. 
The CPI has been validated in 2012 by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (ECJRC) which 














score (i.e., 10) minus each country’s corruption leve . Thus, in line with H1, we expect the 
coefficient b1 to be positive indicating that firms in more corrupt countries capitalize higher 
amounts of development costs.  
To avoid the Corruption proxy capturing the underlying effect of other country-level 
factors which could also have an influence on manageri l accounting choice, country-level 
controls include the following: RDdivergence is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
capitalization of development or research costs was permitted or required prior to 2005 and 0 
if no such capitalization was permitted. CivCom is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 
if the country is characterised with common law and 1 if with civil law. InvProtection is a 
measure of investor protection calculated as principal component analysis of disclosure, 
liability standards, and anti-director rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). 
Enforcement is an index capturing the quality of audit function and degree of accounting 
enforcement in each country developed by Brown, Preiato, and Tarca, (2014). MrktDev is the 
market capitalization of listed companies as a % of GDP and AntiselfDeal is the Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti self-dealing index, which is another proxy 
for invertor protection.16 
In addition, we include a battery of firm level control variables namely: book to market 
ratio (BM), as a measure of risk and growth; having a big 4 auditor (Big4AR), as a monitoring 
mechanism; reporting frequency (RepFreq), as a proxy for companies’ transparency in 
reporting; RDValue which is a proxy for the success of a firm’s R&D exp nditure; R&D 
intensity (RDInt) which determines whether the magnitude of R&D expenditure affects the 
decision to capitalize R&D; the natural logarithm of market value of the company (Size); beta 
(Beta) as a proxy for risk because riskier firms are more likely to engage in basic research 
which is expensed than less risky firms (Aboody & Lev, 1998); and finally, total debt to book 
                                                 
16 Including numerous country-level characteristics may enhance multicollinearity. Thus, in all our models we 














value of equity (Leverage), as a proxy for financial health. Additionally, we include the ratio 
of foreign sales to total sales (IntSalesPerc) to capture whether internationalization is 
associated with the level of capitalization through synergies with international partners.  
We also create dummy variables which capture the likelihood of a company managing 
earnings in an attempt to achieve certain earnings targets. Following Dinh et al. (2016), we 
introduce PastBeat which takes the value of 1 if prior year’s earnings are greater than this 
year’s earnings, assuming full expensing and smaller than this year’s earnings assuming full 
capitalization, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we include a similar dummy variable for the zero 
earnings threshold (ZeroBeat). Specifically, this takes the value of 1 if the zero earnings 
threshold is greater that this year’s earnings assuming full expensing and smaller than this 
year’s earnings assuming full capitalization, and 0 otherwise. We also combine the latter two 
proxies and construct a benchmark beating earnings management variable, BenchBeat. With 
all these controls, we minimize any concerns of correlated omitted variables and we are 
effectively able to isolate and capture the effect of corruption itself. 
Subsequently, for testing H3, we estimate the same regression across the sub-samples of 
low and high internationalization. Internationalizat on is measured by the ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales (Dauth et al., 2017; Glaum, Baetge, Grothe, & Oberdörster, 2013; Hamori 
& Koyuncu, 2011). Based upon this measure, we then calculate the median value which 
determines the two sub-samples of high and low interna ional firms respectively. We then use 
Wald tests to compare the magnitude of the coefficints of the variable Corruption to infer 
the differential association between domestic corruption and the amounts capitalized across 















3.3 Capitalized development costs, corruption, and future performance (H2 & H4) 
Nadiri and Prucha (1996) and Lev and Sougiannis (1996) suggest that, on average, the 
benefits of R&D have a useful life of five to nine y ars and that earnings is deemed as a more 
direct measure of the benefits associated with R&D. Informed by this, we employ an 
adaptation of the regression models employed by Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone (2002), Amir et 
al. (2007) and Ahmed and Falk (2009) as follows:17  
NI= a0 + b1RDCap + b2RDCap*Corruption + b3RDExp + b4RDExp*Corruption + 
b5Corruption + b6∑Controls + Industry fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ε  
(2) 
where, NI is one measure of future earnings, being the sum of future earnings measured from 
year t+1 to year t+5 (e.g., for capitalization in 2010 sum of future earnings relates to the 
period 2011 to 2015) scaled by the market value of quity. Earnings are defined as operating 
income plus the R&D expense and depreciation and amortisation. As an alternative, we also 
employ NI2 which is the sum of future earnings defined as the net profit before extraordinary 
items, R&D expenditure, depreciation and amortisation measured from t+1 to t+5 scaled by 
the market value of equity. For both NI and NI2, we add back R&D expenditure and 
depreciation and amortisation to avoid the mechanical association in earnings that may affect 
our inferences (Amir et al., 2007; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). The time lag of five years for 
future earnings is common in prior literature (see Kothari et al., 2002; Amir et al., 2007; 
Ahmed & Falk, 2009).  
RDCap is the amount of R&D capitalized during the year and RDExp is the amount of 
R&D expensed during the year, both scaled by the market value of equity. To test H2, and 
subsequently H4, we introduce our measure of corruption both as a main determinant as well 
                                                 
17 Although we briefly outline the reasoning for the inclusion of the various variables in our model, more 
details on the justifications for the inclusion of the control variables can be found in: Kothari et al. (2002), 














as an interaction term with the R&D asset (RDCap) and R&D expense (RDExp).18 We also 
include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company capitalizes development costs during 
the year (CAP). This is included in order to capture the effect of capitalization decision on 
cumulative future earnings and, in this way, we can isolate inferences about the future 
profitability of capitalizers compared to expensers (i.e. differences in the constant). Following 
Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. (2007) controls include capital expenditure (Capex), 
Leverage and Size (both defined as in the previous regression model).19 Moreover, we include 
the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (IntSalesPerc) to capture whether internationalization 
is associated with firms’ future profitability through greater market access. In addition, we 
include the same country controls as in the previous regression model.  
A positive coefficient of b1 will indicate that the capitalized amount of development 
costs in a given year is associated with future economic benefits which would be in line with 
the asset recognition criteria in IAS 38. The coefficient b2 captures the incremental effect of 
corruption on this relation. Consistent with H2, weexpect the coefficient b2 to be negative 
and b1 to be positive indicating that the capitalized amount of R&D is associated with lower 
future economic benefits in countries with higher levels of corruption. Considering that this is 
the first study to analyze the consequences of R&D expenditure to future profits under IFRS, 
while considering expensed and capitalised amounts separately, we do not have an ex-ante 
prediction for the coefficient of R&D expense (i.e., b3 and b4).  
                                                 
18 An alternative research design would be to use a three-way interaction (between: R&D expenditure, CAP 
(the indicator variable for capitalizers) and Corruption). However, we abstain from using a three way 
interaction considering the associated complexity in interpreting the corresponding coefficient. Given that our 
setting allows us to separate Expenditure into two components (i.e., RDCap and RDExp), we opt for 
interacting the two separate components with Corruption instead. 
19 We note that the main difference between our model and the model in Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. 
(2007) is the dependent variable. These studies focus on the uncertainty of the future economic benefits 
associated with R&D and use the volatility of future earnings as the dependent variable. We are interested on 
the future economic benefits arising from R&D expenditure and use the sum of future earnings instead. A 
second, but rather subtle, difference is that both Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. (2007) control f r 














Similar to Oswald and Zarowin (2007) and Cazavan-Jenny et al. (2011), we control for 
the endogenous decision to capitalize R&D using the two-stage approach of Heckman (1979) 
and use the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) retrieved from estimating a probit model. The results 
of these estimations are presented in Appendix I.20 
In estimating all regressions (equations 1, and 2), we add industry dummy variables 
based on the ICB Level 1 industry classification. Further, we also control for cross-sectional 
and time series correlation by adding year fixed effects and clustering by country (c.f., Barth 
& Israeli, 2013; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz 2013).  We winsorise all the continuous variables 
at the 1 percent level on both tails of the distribution. We report all the variables employed in 
our models along with their definitions and source in Appendix II. 
Finally, for testing H4, we estimate model (2) across the sub-samples of low and high 
internationalization as described earlier and compare the size of the coefficients, and the 
significance of any difference, of the variable RDCap*Corruption. This allows inferences 
about the differential influence of domestic corruption on the association between capitalized 
development costs and future profitability across the two sub-samples.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of institutional characteristics such as corruption 
(Corruption), market development (MrktDev) and quality of audit function and degree of 
accounting enforcement (Enforcement) for the countries included in our sample. This reveals 
a range of values for corruption and other country-level relevant variables. For example, 
Australia, Sweden, Denmark and Finland have the lowest levels of corruption (ranging from 
                                                 
20 In untabulated tests, which are available upon request, we find that capitalisers differ significantly from 
expensers in almost all variables with exemption to the presence of a big 4 auditor (Big4_AR), financial 
reporting frequency (RepFreq), investor protection (InvProtection) and anti-self-dealing index (AntiselfDeal). 















0.639 to 1.323). At the other extreme, Italy, South Africa, Greece, Portugal and Spain have 
the highest levels of corruption (ranging from 3.554 to 5.925). Additionally, for the same sets 
of countries, values of enforcement range from 32 to 52 for those countries with low 
corruption levels and between 26 to 46 for the countries with higher levels of corruption, 
depicting a large overlap in enforcement levels. The overlaps in enforcement and variations 
in corruption could indicate that enforcement should not be used as a substitute for 
corruption. Finally, it is noted that, in the majority of countries in our sample, an option or a 
requirement to capitalize development costs and/or even some research costs was present 
under local accounting standards before adoption of IFRS (i.e., RDdivergence equals 1 for 
most countries). This indicates that most firms should have had some prior experience around 
development costs’ capitalization. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our models for the full 
sample. These reveal that 46.8% of firm-year observations in our sample capitalize some 
development costs while the remaining expense all R&D costs in the income statement. 
While the capitalized development costs (RDCap) accounts for 1.3% of market value on 
average, the expensed R&D (RDExp) is around 5.6% of MV. The average firm-year 
observation in our sample has also a book value to market value of equity (BM) of 0.68, 
shows a material R&D intensity (RDInt) of 6.2%, and has a Leverage ratio of around 64.3%. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Further, untabulated analyses on the time-series properties of R&D and corruption 
indicates that corruption is time variant albeit it changes marginally from year to year. 
Further, we do not identify any systematic trend or variation in R&D and/or corruption. 
To get a better understanding of the underlying data across countries with high and low 














split the sample across these median values. We provide descriptive statistics across the 
resulting sub-samples in Table 4.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
First, we draw attention on the underlying relations between R&D intensity (RDInt) and 
R&D costs capitalized and expensed (RDCap and RDExp, respectively).21 The results show 
that companies operating in countries with higher leve s of corruption are significantly less 
R&D intense and expense significantly lower R&D expnditures, relative to their total assets, 
compared to companies in countries with lower levels of corruption (mean RDInt: 0.057 vs 
0.067, p-value of difference<0.01; mean RDExp_TA: 0.053 vs 0.056, p-value of 
difference<0.05). These descriptive statistics also reveal no significant difference across the 
two sub-samples with regards to the amounts of capitalized (RDCap_TA: 0.009 vs 0.010, p-
value of difference>0.10). These findings are in support of our hypothesis that companies in 
countries with higher levels of corruption tend to capitalize higher amounts of their total 
R&D expenditure.  
Second, we note that firms in countries with higher levels of corruption are less likely to 
employ a Big 4 auditor (mean Big4AR: 0.778 vs 0.855, p-value of difference<0.01). 
Interestingly, enforcement, investor protection andti-self dealing are significantly higher in 
countries with more corruption (mean Enforcement: 46.588 vs 43.326; mean I vProtection 
0.476 vs 0.440; mean AntiselfDeal: 0.597 vs 0.513; all p-values of differences<0.01). These 
indicate that corruption is not necessarily the same as the lack of formal monitoring. Thus, 
corruption appears to be indeed a distinct institutional characteristic.  
 
                                                 
21 In this table, R&D variables are scaled by total assets so that we can make more direct comparisons between 














4.2 Univariate analysis 
We present Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables in Table 5. The correlations 
between the key variables of interest (i.e., RDCAP, Corruption, NI and NI2) and other 
variables indicate the following. As hypothesized, the amount capitalized is positively and 
significantly correlated with Corruption (0.074; p<0.01). Additionally, as expected, the 
amount capitalized is also positively and significantly correlated with future earnings (NI and 
NI2 exhibit positive correlation of 0.301 and 0.310 respectively, at 1% level) and, in line with 
prior literature, earnings benchmark beating (PastBeat, ZeroBeat and BenchBeat, all exhibit a 
positive correlation of 0.184, 0.336, 0.259 respectiv ly, at 1% level), BM (i.e., growth) 
(0.254; p<0.01), RDInt (0.243; p<0.01), Leverage (0.042, p<0.05), and Enforcement (0.094; 
p<0.05).  
From this univariate analysis, we can infer that companies in environments with higher 
corruption levels capitalize higher amounts of development costs and that development costs 
capitalized in a given year are associated with future earnings. However, these statistics are 
unable to shed light on the remaining three hypotheses as they are based on a univariate 
correlation and cannot bring into light the moderating effect of corruption and 
internationalization. Thus, results are further explored with multivariate analyses in the 
following section. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Multivariate analysis and discussion 
Table 6 reports results for multivariate analysis te ting the effect of corruption on the 
magnitude of development costs capitalized. Models 1, 3 and 5 differ from 2, 4 and 6 
respectively only for the measures used to proxy earnings benchmark beating.  
Focusing on the full sample, the results support H1: firms in countries with higher levels 














is positive as expected (0.004) and statistically significant across both models 1 and 2 
(always at the 1% level). When reflecting on the underlying data, this suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, a one point increase in Corruption (10% of the scale) induces a 0.004 increase in 
RDCap. This is approximately 75,383 euros additional development costs capitalized.22 
Confirming univariate analysis, our results also indicate that the amount of capitalized 
development costs is positively associated with R&D intensity (RDInt reports coefficients of 
0.082 and 0.098, p<0.01), growth (BM reports coefficients of 0.016 and 0.018, p<0.01), and
leverage (Leverage reports coefficients of 0.009, p<0.01). Internationalization (IntSalesPerc) 
also loads significantly at the 1%, albeit its economic significance is marginal given that the 
coefficients are close to zero. In addition, we repo t that Size is negatively related to the 
amount of development costs capitalized (Size reports coefficients of -0.002 and -0.003, 
p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively). Further, our multivariate analysis confirms that amount of 
development costs capitalized is significantly affected by earnings management incentives, 
as the coefficients for the measures derived from Dinh et al. (2016) are always positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (PastBeat, ZeroBeat, and BenchBeat report 
coefficients of 0.018, 0.035, and 0.026, respectively).  
When focusing on the country control factors, RDdivergence is positively associated 
with the amount of development costs capitalized. This suggests that firms with prior 
experience in capitalizing such intangible assets have a higher tendency to capitalize 
(RDdivergence reports a coefficient of 0.021, p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively). Further, 
capitalized development costs are positively associated with enforcement (Enforcement 
yields a coefficient of 0.001, p<0.01). We interpret this finding as an indication that when 
quality of audit function and accounting compliance is high, companies follow the standard 
and do capitalize the development costs. Finally, we find that companies capitalize less 
                                                 
22 Recall that Corruption can vary between zero and ten. Thus, a one point increase equates to 10%. From our 
unscaled data, the mean value of development costs apitalised in a given year is 18,845,780 euros. Thus, 














development costs in countries that impose stricter rules to protect shareholders from 
expropriation by insiders (AntiselfDeal has a coefficient of -0.044, p<0.01). This finding 
indicates that firms would be less inclined to capitalize development costs for self-serving 
purposes.   
Models 3 to 6 report the multivariate analyses testing H3. These tests report that the 
coefficient for Corruption is positively and significantly associated with the amount of 
development costs capitalized, only for the sub-sample of firms with lower international 
exposure (0.005, p<0.01). Moreover, the size of the co fficients of the variable Corruption 
across all models indicate that these are significatly higher for the sub-sample of firms with 
lower international exposure (Wald = 3.99, p<0.05, for Model 3 vs model 5; Wald = 3.97, 
p<0.05, for Model 4 vs Model 6). This is in support f H3. When reflecting on the 
underlying data for this sub-sample, this finding suggests that, ceteris paribus, a one point 
increase in Corruption (10% of the scale) induces a 0.005 increase in RDCap. This is 
approximately 41,200 euros additional development cos s capitalized for companies in this 
sub-sample in a given year.23 
TABL  6 ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 reports results for multivariate analysis te ting the association between development 
costs capitalized in a given year and cumulative earnings five years ahead. Further, these 
tests provide insights regarding the moderating role of corruption on this association, both 
for the full sample and across the sub-samples of firms with lower and higher levels of 
internationalization. These analyses test hypotheses H2 and H4. As previously, Models 7, 9 
and 11 differ from 8, 10 and 12 respectively, only for the measures used to proxy earnings 
management incentives.  
                                                 
23 From our unscaled data, the mean value of development costs capitalised in a given year is 8,238,013 euros. 














First, these results confirm the expectation that cpitalized development costs are 
mirrored in future economic benefits. The coefficient for RDCap is positive and statistically 
significant across all model specifications and for b th sub-samples. To demonstrate the 
economic significance of this contribution as an example, the coefficient of RDCap for the 
full sample for model 7 is 9.958 (p<0.01). This suggests that, holding MV constant to scale 
both variables, an one point increase in RDCap in a given year induces a 9.96 points increase 
in cumulative earnings five years ahead.24   
Additionally, this analysis illustrates the moderating role of corruption in the relationship 
between R&D and future earnings, supporting H2. In both models 7 and 8 the coefficient of 
the interaction between RDCap and Corruption is negative (coefficients: -2.275 and -1.913, 
p<0.01 and p<0.10, respectively). Given the positive coefficient of RDCap, this result 
suggests that the benefits from the capitalized development costs and future earnings are 
significantly lower in countries with higher corruption (the benefit in these countries is about 
eight times higher, not ten). Additionally, expensed R&D (RDExp) is also positively 
correlated with future earnings (coefficients: 2.696 and 2.820, p<0.05 in both cases). The 
latter suggests that there is still an element in the amounts expensed that contributes to future 
earnings. Further, we note that the effect of corruption upon the association between 
expensed R&D and future earnings is consistently insignificant. This result suggests that 
corruption has an adverse effect on the future economic benefits arising from the capitalized 
R&D alone. This finding further corroborates our underlying argument in the hypotheses 
development that corruption facilitates prima facie justification of meeting the capitalization 
criteria and eliminates a potential alternative explanation that firms in countries with higher 
levels of corruption invest in R&D which creates les value.  
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
24 Similar conclusions can be inferred when using the co fficient of capitalized R&D (RDCap, Model 1, Table 














Further, the results across the sub-samples of firms with higher and lower levels of 
internationalization provide a clearer picture of the role of domestic corruption. The tests 
across Models 9 and 12 reveal that the contribution of capitalized development costs to 
future earnings varies with the levels of corruption nly for the sub-sample of firms with 
lower levels of internationalization. The coefficient for the interaction between RDCap and 
Corruption is negative (coefficients: -3.146 and -2.373, p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively) for 
this sub-sample. Moreover, the size of the coefficints of the interaction variable RDCap and 
Corruption across all models indicate that these are significatly higher for the sub-sample 
of firms with lower international exposure (Wald = 4.83, p<0.05, for Model 9 vs model 11; 
Wald = 2.80, p<0.10, for Model 10 vs model 12). These results are in support of H4.  
Table 7 also shows that larger firms tend to be more profitable (coefficients of Size: 
0.046 and 0.047, p<0.01 for both). This result is primarily driven by more international 
companies (coefficients: 0.055 and 0.065, p<0.05). Capital expenditure is positively related 
to future earnings indicating that investment in fixed assets contribute positively to future 
earnings (coefficients: 4.317 and 3.104, p<0.01). This finding holds across both sub-samples 
of companies with higher and lower level of internationalization. 
On reflection of our hypotheses and informed by prior literature, the following 
inferences can be drawn from the combined results of these tests and those presented in 
Table 6. Whilst the level of development cost capitalization is positively associated with a 
number of firm-level characteristics, for instance, R&D intensity, growth, leverage and 
incentives to beat earnings benchmarks, it is also ssociated with corruption as a country 
characteristic. Corruption is positively associated with the amount of development costs 
capitalized by companies in a given year. This results in lower contribution of the capitalized 
development costs to future earnings. This finding is particularly associated with the sub-














domestic corruption does not impair the benefit from the amounts capitalized, suggesting 
that these amounts more genuinely represent future economic benefits which are mirrored in 
companies’ future profitability.  
The examination of corruption as a country factor influencing a specific albeit very 
important accounting outcome and our corresponding findings provide new insights into the 
accounting literature. Further, these findings bridge the evidence from the wider business 
and management literature by demonstrating that a highly pervasive country characteristic 
trickles down to managers’ decision making with regards to the recognition of materially 
important assets signaling companies’ value. Even though formal institutional mechanisms 
such as enforcement and monitoring powers are in place, corruption still permeates 
accounting choices and the resultant reliability of information on companies’ financial 
statements. 
 
4.4 Market performance of capitalizers and expensers 
We hypothesised that, an environment with higher cor uption facilitates managers to justify 
the capitalization of development costs. In turn, these development costs do not deliver as 
high as expected future earnings and our findings corroborate these hypotheses. However, it 
is an open question whether or not equity market participants can see through the distorted 
signals associated with higher levels of capitalized development costs in countries with 
higher levels of corruption. In order to explore this, we examine whether capitalizers, in 
countries with higher levels of corruption, exhibit lower or equal stock returns to those in 














one year and five years following the recognition of an R&D asset, respectively.25 If the 
market is unable to see through these distorted signals, abnormal returns for both sub-
samples should not be significantly different. In contrast, given the evidence in prior 
literature that it takes on average five years for the benefits of R&D expenditure to accrue 
(e.g., Nadiri & Prucha, 1996; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996) and our findings that capitalized 
development costs contribute positively to cumulative earnings five years ahead, albeit less 
in countries with higher levels of corruption, we should expect abnormal returns in the long-
term to be lower for companies in countries with higher corruption levels. We present the 
findings of these analyses in Table 8. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 8 presents the results using 
the short (long) window.   
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
The results reported in Table 8 (Panel A) indicate that one-year excess returns of 
capitalizers, across countries with high and low corruption levels, are not statistically 
different (t-stat: 0.981). Further, we find insignificant abnormal returns for either of the sub-
samples, arguably because of the uncertainty around the delivery of the benefits of the 
capitalized amounts. In contrast, the results in Pael B, show that both sub-samples report 
significantly positive five-year ahead abnormal retu ns. However, these are significantly 
lower for the sub-sample of the capitalizers in countries with higher corruption levels (t-stat: 
4.368). In addition, we find that capitalizers earn excess returns relative to expensers only in 
                                                 
25 We measure abnormal returns using a “June strategy” approach following prior literature on R&D (e.g. 
Chan et al., 2001, for the US; Duki et al., 2015, for European firms). Specifically, we rank all companies in 
each country every year in June based on their market capitalisation and allocate them to five portfolios based 
on their market capitalisation. Following Loughran d Ritter (2000) and Gregory, Guermat, and Al-
Shawawreh (2010), we do not consider book to market con rols. Portfolios are rebalanced annually. Then, we 
calculate buy and hold returns abnormal returns from July and for one and five years measured as the 
difference between the return of the firm and the return of the match size portfolio. Firm monthly returns are 
measured using the datastream’s Return Index (RI) which is subsequently screened following Ince and Porter 
(2006). Further, we treat returns as missing when Rt or Rt-1 are greater than 300% and (1+ Rt)(1+ Rt-1) is less 
than 50%. Returns are value-weighted according to their market capitalisations. The advantage of this 
approach is that the returns are implementable since at the time of portfolio formation all companies should 
have published their financial statements (implicitly this is because we allow December year end firms until 
June to publish their financial statements). We note that, in these tests, due to missing data on returns we lose a 














the long term and for firms in countries with lower corruption levels (t-stat: 4.293). These 
findings indicate that capitalizers in countries with higher corruption levels not only perform 
similarly to expensers in these countries in the long-term (t-stat: 1.229) but also enjoy lower 
abnormal returns compared to capitalizers in countries with lower corruption levels. 
Taken together, the evidence is indicative of the distortive signal of capitalization in 
countries with higher levels of corruption. In the short-term, investors are unable to 
recognize the future earnings implications of R&D capitalized, since abnormal returns are 
indifferent among capitalizers across the two sub-samples. However, this is corrected in the 
longer term as more information becomes available and capitalizers in countries with lower 
corruption levels perform better than expensers in these countries as well as capitalizers in 
countries with higher corruption levels. This is not surprising as it takes time for the benefits 
of R&D investments to unravel. Effectively, these findings, from a market perspective, 
reflect the findings regarding H2 that, in the long-term, the economic benefits from 
capitalised development costs in countries with higher corruption levels contribute less to 
future earnings compared to those in countries withlower corruption levels. 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
To examine the robustness of our multivariate analysis, we conducted a battery of sensitivity 
analyses.26 These are summarised below.  
The findings presented earlier suggest that, in countries where corruption levels are 
high, companies engage with more aggressive capitalization of development costs. However, 
our research design does not allow us to distinguish whether companies capitalize more than 
they would be a priori expected to capitalise. To address this concern and to shed more light 
on our main findings, we proceed as follows. We draw on the earnings management via 
                                                 














discretionary accruals literature and in the spirit of Jones (1991), Boynton, Dobbins, and 
Plesko (1992) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and we perform additional analyses 
intended to estimate the unexpected amount of development costs capitalized. A similar 
approach has been recently applied by Cheng et al. (2016) who focus on capitalized 
development costs as a determinant of audit fees in China. Subsequently, we test the 
association between this unexpected amount with the country-level of corruption, while 
controlling for all other country factors.  
More specifically, we create industry-year clusters and estimate our model (1), used to 
test H1, with fixed effects, excluding all country controls cross-sectionally for each cluster. 
Then, we generate RDCAPexpected and RDCAPunexpected by estimating the fitted values 
and residuals respectively. Subsequently, we replac RDCAPexpected and 
RDCAPunexpected equal to zero for Expensers, given that we are only interested in splitting 
RDCap, not in identifying a measure of potential capitaliz tion for Expensers. Then, we 
replicate our main analysis for H1 and H3 by decompsing RDCap to RDCAPExpected and 
RDCAPunexpected. Consistent with our prediction, results show that corruption drives 
RDCAPUnexpected and the difference across the two subsamples for this coefficient is 
significant. In fact, the coefficients for corruption in these regressions are significantly 
higher for those reported in our main test (e.g., it is 0.008 for the sub-sample of companies 
with low internationalization exposure). Further wes e that corruption is associated with 
RDCAPExpected. However, the coefficient is 0.001 and there is no difference among the two 
subsamples of high and low internationalization. Overall, these findings confirm the trend 
we identify in our main analyses that the higher the domestic corruption the higher the 
amounts capitalized.  
As a next step, we replicate our main analysis for H2 and H4 by introducing both 














these variables with corruption. The results from these tests show that both RDCAPExpected 
and RDCAPUnexpected contribute positively to future earnings. Further, the unexpected 
element has a significantly lower contribution to future earnings, compared to the expected. 
With respect to our focal variable of interest, corruption results in a significantly larger 
reduction to the association between RDCAPUnexpected and future earnings compared to 
the expected element. Additionally, the difference across the two subsamples of 
internationalization levels for this coefficient is significant.   
Beyond these tests, we consider the potential concern to our results that the measure of 
corruption may not capture country corruption in an efficient way. To alleviate this concern, 
we repeat all our tests by using an alternative measur  of corruption. More specifically, we 
examine whether our results hold when we measure coruption based on ‘Bribery and 
Corruption’ provided by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) 
Yearbooks. Our main results are robust to substitution of corruption ‘Bribery and 
Corruption’.  
Moreover, we have acknowledged some, albeit little, variation in the scores of country 
corruption levels over time (see discussion in sub-ection 4.1). On reflection of this, we have 
performed yearly regressions as an alternative to the pooled regression results. The results 
from these tests show that our findings are qualitatively similar to those presented earlier. 
It is known that managers tend to decrease discretionary spending (e.g., R&D) to 
improve short run performance. Following this reasoning, corruption could be associated 
with lower amounts of development costs capitalized due to lower levels of R&D 
expenditures in the first place. In order to be assured that that omitting reduction in R&D 
investments from our tests does not drive the associati ns we are capturing in our main 
analysis, we calculate RDcut as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if R&D 














introduce it as control variable both in equations 1 and 3. The results obtained are 
qualitatively similar to those presented earlier in the paper.  
For testing H1 and H3, we employ development costs capitalized scaled by market value 
of equity for consistency with the research design for testing H2 and H4. Arguably, 
employing the amount of capitalized development costs to total R&D expenditure as a 
dependent variable for these tests would be a more appropriate proxy. Such a design could 
provide assurances that our tests capture a decision effect and not the outcome of an effect 
driven by the fact that firms in more corrupted countries are potentially more R&D intense 
and then mechanically capitalize more. Even though the descriptive statistics in Table 4 
indicate that this is not the case, we have implemented such an approach as a sensitivity test 
and results for both hypotheses hold as reported earlier. However, both in these tests and in 
our main tests for testing H1 and H3, we introduce R&D intensity as a control variable, 
effectively controlling for the concerns discussed arlier. We note that this design may 
induce a mechanical association between the dependent and this independent variable. To 
alleviate such a concern, we repeat this sensitivity tests by dropping R&D intensity and the 
results remain the same. 
Moreover, in our main tests, we do not control for the effect of firm governance. In 
additional analyses, we include the percentage of closely held shares (WC08021), as a proxy 
for governance, and re-run our analysis.27 Although the sample size decreases because of 
data unavailability, our conclusions remain qualitatively similar.   
For testing H1 and H3, it could be argued that corruption captures the potential influence 
of low audit quality instead. On reflection of this, we capture audit fees (Worldscope item: 
WC01801) for our sample firms and repeat the relevant analysis by including in equation 1 
                                                 
27 We have considered alternative proxies for a firm’s corporate governance: governance score (GOVSCORE) 
available from ASSET 4 or a measure of holdings by pension funds and institutional investors (Datastream 
codes: NOSHPF and NOSHIC, respectively). However, requiring this data would result in significant reduction 














the log of audit fees as an additional control variable. Although the sample size decreases 
because of data unavailability, the results from this analysis are very similar with those 
presented in the paper.  
For the analyses presented in Table 7 with regards to H2 and H4, one could argue that 
economic growth may be lower in countries with higher levels of corruption compared to 
those countries with lower levels of corruption. Thus, it could be argued that it is not 
surprising that development costs capitalized would then produce lower levels of future 
profit flows. To account for this, we estimate country GDP growth for the entire five-year 
periods which we use to measure cumulative future earnings. These tests reveal that five-
year change in GDP is positively but only marginally significantly associated with firm-level 
future profitability. The results with regard to the ypotheses tested are qualitatively similar 
to those presented earlier.  
Further, in our main tests, we control for level differences in enforcement across 
countries although we do not control for actual regulatory changes that potentially moderate 
the observed relationship. For example, Daske, Luzi, Christian, and Verdi (2013) point out 
that changes in enforcement are an important driver of the benefits of mandatory IFRS 
reporting. On reflection of this, we consider that changes in enforcement may be correlated 
with our corruption measure, resulting in biased findings. Thus, we endeavour to control for 
changes in enforcement. In doing so, we consider the study by Christensen et al. (2013) who 
examine mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in enforcement. According to Table 1 in 
Christensen et al. (2013), the only countries in our sample period (2006-2010) which 
experienced a substantive change in enforcement are Ireland (2007), Sweden (2007), and 
Hong Kong (2008). Consequently, we exclude Ireland, Sweden, and Hong Kong and 
replicate our main analysis. Our conclusions based on these tests remain the same with those 














Additionally, we note that our inferences are similar when we estimate the Inverse Mills 
Ratio from a probit model which includes country fixed effects instead of country variables.  
Further, to alleviate any concerns that we introduce biases in our analysis by including 
financial firms, we replicate all our tests by dropping firms from the Financial sector (i.e., 37 
observations). Our main results are robust to this additional test, showing that inclusion of 
financial firms does not influence our inferences.  
In addition, we replicate all our analysis by excluding countries with less than 20 firm-
year observations. Following this approach, we drop firms from Philippines, Portugal, and 
Singapore. Our main results are also robust to this additional test, showing that less 
represented countries do not influence our inferences. 
Further, our main tests control for the cross-sectional and time series correlation by 
adding year fixed-effects and clustering by country, following Barth and Israeli (2013) and 
Christensen et al., (2013). Whilst clustering at the country-level may yield more reliable 
inferences, we replicate our tests by clustering standard errors at the firm level and obtain 
qualitatively similar results.  
Moreover, we note that, for testing H3 and H4, we split the sample based on the median 
of the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. As a ensitivity test, we estimate the industry 
medians on the ratio of foreign sales to total sales nd we re-run our tests accordingly. We 
choose the industry given that R&D expenditure varies significantly across industries. The 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Finally, we note that all values of any pairs of independent variables should be well 
below the critical range of 0.8, above which multicollinearity could cause a threat to the 
regression results (Gujarati, 2003: 359). From the Pearson correlation matrix it appears that, 
only the correlations between anti-self-dealing index and two other control variables (i.e., 














self-dealing index exhibits some of the same properties as the anti-director rights index as 
well as of the indices of shareholder protection through securities laws presented in La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 461), we replicate all tests by 
excluding anti-self-dealing. Our conclusions remain the same following this analysis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The accounting treatment of R&D has been a controversial issue among standards setters, 
financial statement preparers and users as well as ac demics. Advocates for capitalizing 
some of these costs argue that such costs constitute investments which will generate future 
economic benefits and hence should be capitalized (e.g., Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). In line 
with this premise, IFRS prescribe that, when certain cr teria are met development costs must 
be capitalized. Arguably, by imposing restrictive conditions, IAS 38 reduces managerial 
opportunism that may result from discretion involved in the capitalization of development 
costs (Markarian et al., 2008; Matolcsy & Wyatt, 2006). Thus, one would expect that only 
development expenditures from those R&D projects, which are highly likely to be 
successful, are capitalized. As a consequence, managers can signal their private information 
about the expected success of R&D ventures and their related future benefits (Abrahams & 
Sidhu, 1998; Oswald & Zarowin, 2007; Ritter & Wells, 2006).  
However, since the application of the conditions in IAS 38 requires managers to make 
judgements, capitalization of development costs under IAS 38 remains subject to managerial 
discretion. Such premise finds support in academic research which reports that the discretion 
involved in capitalization of development costs can be used for opportunistic earnings 
management (Cazavan-Jeny & Jeanjean, 2006, Dinh et al., 2016). This is why the reliability 














argument substantiating FASB’s decision to require expensing of all R&D expenditure. This 
debate, in part, gives rise to this research.  
We employ a large sample of listed firms, reporting under IFRS, across the world and 
draw on prior business and management literature to explore the potential effect of 
corruption on the capitalization of development costs. More specifically, we consider that, in 
environments with high levels of corruption, managers can exploit the features of the 
environment and capitalize of development costs which ordinarily should have been 
expensed. If this holds, managers provide an inflated signal about the future economic 
benefits expected from the amounts capitalized in agiven year. Indicative of this inflated 
signal would be evidence that the association of the development costs capitalized in a given 
year has a lower contribution (i.e., association) t fu ure profitability. Our empirical findings 
support both hypotheses. Further our results show tat the effect of corruption is moderated 
by the level of companies’ international exposure. Our results remain robust to a number of 
sensitivity tests. Finally, we conduct further tests which suggest that in the short-term firms 
in countries with higher corruption levels earn similar stock returns to firms from countries 
with lower corruption levels. In contrast, we find that capitalizers in countries with higher 
corruption exhibit lower positive abnormal returns in the long-term. This suggests that 
investors are unable to discern the future economic benefits associated with the capitalized 
R&D expenditure in the short-term but this is corrected in the long-term, as more 
information becomes available.  
Beyond the academic contributions arising from this study, our findings have wider 
policy implications. In an attempt to minimize venal corruption, anti-corruption initiatives 
concentrate at public-sector levels. However, corruption can also be of an institutional form 
(i.e., generally not technically illegal, but a systemic ‘gaming’ to subvert the intent of 














this study, we demonstrate that a combination of facets of venal and institutional forms of 
corruption can effectively trickle down even to the accounting choices listed companies 
make. Such a behaviour results in providing company stakeholders with distorted signals for 
future profitability and current asset values. Importantly, this permeable, subtle and informal 
country characteristic is associated with accounting choices even after controlling for formal 
institutional characteristics such as investor protection, anti-self-dealing index, accounting 
enforcement and law type.  
As is the case with every study, the present paper is also subject to several caveats. First, 
our main tests for the second hypothesis are based on a five-year horizon. While the choice is 
motivated by the evidence in prior literature, it may not be sufficiently long to capture all of 
the benefits arising from the R&D expenditure. Furthe , the measure of country-level 
corruption we employ (i.e. Corruption Perceptions Index) is determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. While we attempt to address this by using ‘Bribery and 
Corruption’ provided by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) 
Yearbooks as a sensitivity test, the limitation that the corruption measure is based upon 
surveys remains. Further, our market-based tests asume an equal level of market efficiency 
across firms from low and high corruption which may not be the case. Future research could 
investigate in depth whether this indeed an issue or not. Additionally, whilst we demonstrate 
that corruption permeates accounting choices this is not to dismiss other forms of informal 
institutional country influences such as societal trust. Reflecting upon evidence that country-
level societal trust influences the perceived reliability of accounting numbers by investors 
(Papanastasopoulos & Tsiritakis, 2015), future researchers could explore the potential joint 
effect of societal trust and corruption on the market performance of capitalizers and 














and users’ views on the discretion involved with regard to capitalization of development 
















Probit model employed for estimation of IMR: Decision to capitalize development costs  
Dependent variable: CAP 
VARIABLES  
Constant -2.128**  
 (-2.52) 
Corruption 0.132***  
 (2.86) 
BM a 0.033 
 (0.55) 
RDValue a 0.000 
 (0.06) 
RDInt a -0.402 
 (-0.59) 
Size  -0.050* 
 (-1.72) 
Beta a 0.040 
 (1.16) 
Leverage a 0.172* 
 (1.94) 
IntSalesPerc a 0.003***  
 (3.16) 








Enforcement 0.027***  
 (2.85) 








Industry f.e. Included 
Year f.e. Included 
N 3,186 
Mean VIF 3.48 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 
CAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company capitalizes R&D during the year. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered by country. a 

















VARIABLE DEFINITION DATASTREAM CODE OR 
OTHER SOURCE 
CAP 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company 
capitalizes R&D during the year 
Net development costs: WC02504 
NI 
is the sum of future earnings measured from year t+1 
to year t+5 scaled by the market value of equity. 
Earnings are defined as operating income plus the 
R&D expense and depreciation and amortisation. 
Operative income: WC01250 
R&D expense: WC01201 
D preciation, depletion and 
amortisation: WC01151 
NI2 
is the sum of future earnings measured from year t+1 
to year t+5 scaled by the market value of equity. 
Earnings are defined as income before extraordinary 
items plus the R&D expense and depreciation and 
amortisation. 
Income before extraordinary items: 
WC01551 
R&D expense: WC01201 
Depreciation, depletion and 
amortisation: WC01151 
RDExp 
is the research and development expense scaled by 
the market value of equity  
R&D expense: WC01201 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
RDCap 
is the capitalized amount of R&D measured as the 
change in net R&D assets plus amortisation of R&D 
scaled by the market value of equity 
Net development costs: WC02504 
Amortisation of R&D: WC01153 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
BM is the book to market ratio 
Common equity: WC03501 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
RDValue 
is R&D value measured as the difference between 
the market value of equity and book value of equity 
less amount of R&D capitalized during the year 
divided by the sum of current and lagged annual 
R&D expenditure 
Common equity: WC03501 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
R&D expenditure: RDExp+RDCap 
RDInt 
is the R&D intensity measured as R&D expenditure 
divided by total assets less amount of R&D 
capitalized during the year 
R&D expenditure: RDExp+RDCap 
Total assets: WC02999 
Size 
is the natural logarithm of market value of the 
company measured at the fiscal year end 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
Beta 
is the firm beta estimated using 12 months returns 
over each firm local index  
Datastream regression formula 
Leverage is the total debt to book value of equity 
Total debt: WC03255 
Common equity: WC03501 
IntSalesPerc is the percentage of international sales if total sales IntSalesPerc: WC07101 















VARIABLE  DEFINITION  SOURCE 
PastBeat 
equals to 1 if prior year’s earnings are higher than 
earnings assuming full expensing and prior year’s 
earnings are lower than earnings assuming full 
capitalization and 0 otherwise (see also Dinh et al., 
2016). Earnings refer to net income before extra 
items.  




equals to 1 if earnings assuming full expensing are 
negative and earnings assuming full capitalization 
are positive and 0 otherwise (see also Dinh et al., 
2016). Earnings refer to income before extra items 




equals to 1 if either PastBeat or ZeroBeat equals to 
1, and 0 otherwise 
 
Big4AR 
equals to 1 if the annual report is audited by a Big4 
firm, and 0 otherwise 
Balance Sheet Auditor Code: 
BSAuditorCode 
RepFreq 
represents how often interim earnings are reported 
by the company during its fiscal year 
Earnings Reporting Frequency: 
WC05200 
Capex 
is the capital expenditure for year t scaled by the 
market value of equity 
Capital Expenditure: WC04601 
Market Capitalization: WC08001 
IMR 
is the Inverse Mills Ratio. IMR is calculated from 
the probit model for the amount of R&D capitalized 
in which CAP is the dependent variable. 
 
Corruption 
is the reverse of Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI). The higher the Corruption the more corrupt a 
country is perceived 
Transparency International 
MrktDev 
is the market capitalization of listed companies as a 
% of GDP 
World bank 
Enforcement 
is an index capturing the quality of audit function 
and degree of accounting enforcement in each 
country measured in 2008 
Brown et al. (2014) 
RDdivergence 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
capitalization of development or research costs was 
permitted or required prior to 2005; 0 if no such 
capitalization was permitted.  
Self-constructed, based on Nobes 
(2001) survey and communication 
with academics/experts from each 
country 
InvProtection 
is a measure of investor protection calculated as 
principal component analysis of disclosure, liability 
standards, and anti-director rights  
La Porta et al. (2006) 
AntiselfDeal 
is a measure of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate 
insiders (anti self-dealing index) 
La Porta et al. (2008) 
CivCom 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if 
common law and 1 if civil law 
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Table 1 – Sample selection process and sample distrbution across industries and year  
Panel A: Sample selection process 
47,999 
We focus on the countries adopting IFRS on a mandatory basis in 2005 as 
reported in Daske et al. (2008) excluding Switzerland nd Venezuela and obtain 
data between 2006 and 2010. 
(12,753) 
Firm-year observations for which data item indicating accounting standards is 
missing or reporting standards are not IFRS 
(3,555) First time IFRS adopters 
(1,618) Firms from Oil&Gas industry 
(19,195) Firm-year observations reporting neither R&D expense nor R&D asset  
(1,880) Firm-year observations where both the R&D asset and R&D expense are zero 
(965) Firm-year observations where either the R&D asset or R&D expense are negative 
(3,110) 
Firm-year observations with missing data for future earnings or future cash flows 
estimation 
(109) Firm-year observations that have had their financial year-end changed 
(1,577) Firm-year observations with  missing firm-specific data 
(51) Firm-year observations with missing country-specific data 
3,186 final sample [t = 2006, 2010] [1,077 firms] 
1,695 reporting expensed R&D only (expensers)  
1,491 reporting a capitalized amount of R&D (capitalizers) 
347 reporting capitalized R&D only (full capitalizers) 
1,144 reporting both capitalized and expensed R&D (non-full capitalizers) 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by Industry (ICB level 1) and Year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Basic Materials 53 65 71 73 71 333 
Consumer Goods 84 122 119 117 121 563 
Consumer Services 19 25 26 27 26 123 
Financials 7 8 7 6 9 37 
Health Care 54 82 100 116 119 471 
Industrials 143 201 213 221 219 997 
Technology 81 105 123 123 121 553 
Telecommunications 9 14 10 9 12 54 
Utilities 9 9 12 12 13 55 















Panel C: Sample distribution by Country and Year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Australia 6 60 68 66 64 264 
Austria 15 17 16 16 12 76 
Belgium 10 11 17 16 15 69 
Denmark 21 24 23 19 21 108 
Finland 42 48 41 39 42 212 
France 65 85 78 68 71 367 
Germany 98 112 105 113 118 546 
Greece 9 5 7 11 12 44 
Hong Kong 4 7 10 11 13 45 
Ireland 3 5 6 7 6 27 
Italy 25 30 41 34 35 165 
Netherlands 15 10 11 13 14 63 
Norway 8 11 8 11 10 48 
Philippines 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 2 4 2 2 2 12 
Singapore 3 3 4 2 1 13 
South Africa 4 18 15 11 11 59 
Spain 13 14 16 13 13 69 
Sweden 47 45 43 48 47 230 
UK 69 121 170 204 204 768 
















Table 2 – Country characteristics at the country-level 
Country Corruption MrktDev Enforcement RDdivergence InvProtection AntiselfDeal CivCom 
Australia 1.323 119.267 52 1 0.784 0.757 0 
Austria 1.875 33.671 27 0 0.104 0.213 1 
Belgium 2.822 59.520 44 1 0.068 0.544 1 
Denmark 0.639 67.507 49 1 0.363 0.463 1 
Finland 0.769 83.642 32 1 0.465 0.457 1 
France 2.938 81.094 45 1 0.473 0.379 1 
Germany 2.082 44.985 44 0 0.000 0.282 1 
Greece 5.925 39.851 26 0 0.319 0.217 1 
HongKong 1.740 502.254 52 1 0.851 0.963 0 
Ireland 2.226 34.741 41 1 0.478 0.789 0 
Italy 5.406 28.427 46 1 0.197 0.421 1 
Netherlands 1.154 81.910 43 1 0.537 0.203 1 
Norway 1.460 64.213 47 1 0.436 0.421 1 
Philippines 7.500 69.111 27 0 0.812 0.215 1 
Portugal 3.750 43.534 29 1 0.574 0.444 1 
Singapore 0.723 154.175 32 1 0.770 1.000 0 
South Africa 5.171 222.296 29 1 0.599 0.813 0 
Spain 3.554 89.542 42 1 0.553 0.374 1 
Sweden 0.762 106.956 34 1 0.386 0.333 1 
UK 2.135 114.845 54 1 0.776 0.950 0 
Corruption and MrktDev represent sample means. The remaining variables are time invariant. 















Table 3 – Sample descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max 
CAP 0.468 0.499 0 0 1 
NI a   1.211 1.273 -2.131 0.953 11.015 
NI2 a  0.937 1.103 -2.304 0.746 8.955 
RDExp a  0.056 0.098 0.000 0.021 0.807 
RDCap a  0.013 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.332 
BM a 0.681 0.640 -1.563 0.514 4.768 
RDValue a  58.154 248.349 -299.272 6.667 2513.377 
RDInt a  0.062 0.098 0.000 0.026 0.701 
Size  12.826 2.360 4.187 12.755 18.818 
Beta a  0.947 0.812 -1.490 0.891 4.066 
Leverage a 0.643 0.864 -2.040 0.408 6.356 
IntSalesPerc a 54.497 29.935 0.000 57.125 100.000 
PastBeat 0.225 0.417 0 0 1 
ZeroBeat 0.097 0.296 0 0 1 
BenchBeat 0.276 0.447 0 0 1 
Big4AR 0.816 0.387 0 1 1 
RepFreq 3.006 1.009 1 4 4 
Capex a  0.074 0.111 0.000 0.038 0.949 
IMR 0.894 0.376 0.030 0.854 2.362 
Corruption 2.195 1.249 0.400 2.100 7.500 
MrktDev 91.154 66.849 13.476 73.206 606.004 
Enforcement 44.968 8.046 26 45 54 
RDdivergence 0.791 0.407 0 1 1 
InvProtection 0.458 0.289 0.000 0.473 0.851 
AntiselfDeal 0.555 0.275 0.203 0.421 1.000 
CivCom 0.631 0.483 0 1 1 
















Table 4 – Sample descriptive statistics for across countries with low and high corruption 
 Low corruption ( n=1,582) High corruption ( n=1,604) T - test Mann-Whitney test 
Variable Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean Diff. t - stat 
Median 
Diff. z-stat 
RDExp_TA a 0.056 0.101 0.023 0.053 0.119 0.019 0.003** 1.661 0.019*** 5.810 
RDCap_TA a 0.010 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.895 -0.001*** -3.572 
CAP 0.427 0.495 0.000 0.509 0.500 1.000 -0.082*** -4.655 0.082*** -4.640 
NI  a 1.088 1.167 0.870 1.333 1.359 1.026 -0.245*** -5.462 1.115*** -6.098 
NI2 a 0.863 1.065 0.698 1.010 1.134 0.793 -0.147*** -3.756 0.845*** -4.408 
BM a 0.623 0.549 0.475 0.738 0.714 0.548 -0.115*** -5.109 0.591*** -5.286 
RDValue a 45.290 199.228 7.375 70.842 288.228 5.802 -25.552*** -2.907 32.926** 2.412 
RDInt a 0.067 0.102 0.028 0.057 0.095 0.024 0.010*** 2.906 0.018*** 4.220 
Size  13.030 2.267 12.911 12.625 2.432 12.575 0.405*** 4.857 12.506*** 4.967 
Beta a 0.954 0.823 0.908 0.940 0.802 0.880 0.014 0.494 0.894 1.368 
Leverage a 0.595 0.799 0.372 0.690 0.921 0.438 -0.095*** -3.106 0.467*** -3.354 
IntSalesPerc a 56.943 29.959 60.520 52.085 29.724 54.570 4.858*** 4.594 55.662*** 4.743 
PastBeat 0.233 0.423 0.000 0.217 0.412 0.000 0.016 1.059 -0.016 1.059 
ZeroBeat 0.090 0.286 0.000 0.105 0.306 0.000 -0.015* -1.426 0.015 -1.426 
BenchBeat 0.277 0.448 0.000 0.274 0.446 0.000 0.003 0.161 -0.003 0.161 
Big4AR 0.855 0.353 1.000 0.778 0.416 1.000 0.077*** 5.603 0.924*** 5.576 
RepFreq 3.293 0.964 4.000 2.723 0.972 2.000 0.571*** 16.639 3.429*** 15.963 
Capex a 0.065 0.102 0.033 0.083 0.119 0.044 -0.018*** -4.637 0.051*** -6.503 
IMR 0.979 0.358 0.924 0.809 0.375 0.778 0.170*** 13.113 0.754*** 12.912 
Corruption 1.332 0.530 1.300 3.048 1.166 2.400 -1.716*** -53.369 3.016*** -47.740 
MrktDev 97.907 82.885 81.642 84.493 44.878 72.780 13.415*** 5.691 68.227*** 2.883 
Enforcement 43.326 8.496 44.000 46.588 7.223 45.000 -3.262*** -11.681 47.262*** -13.423 
RDdivergence 0.750 0.433 1.000 0.831 0.375 1.000 -0.081*** -5.671 1.081*** -5.643 
InvProtection 0.440 0.293 0.465 0.476 0.283 0.473 -0.035*** -3.458 0.501*** -3.480 
AntiselfDeal 0.513 0.256 0.457 0.597 0.286 0.421 -0.085*** -8.785 0.542*** -8.666 
CivCom 0.668 0.471 1.000 0.594 0.491 1.000 0.074*** 4.339 0.926*** 4.327 
Countries with high (low) corruption are defined as those countries of which corruption score is above (below) the median corruption score of all countries in our  
sample in a given year. Firms with high (low) capitlization intensity are defined those of which the ratio of capitalized R&D over R&D expenditure is above (below)  
the industry-year median. RDCap_TA and RDExp_TA are scaled by total assets less amount of R&D capitalized during the year for comparison with RDInt.  














Table 5 – Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) CAP 1          
(2) NI  a 0.103*** 1         
(3) NI2 a 0.118*** 0.918*** 1        
(4) RDExp a 0.033* 0.384*** 0.387*** 1       
(5) RDCap a 0.393*** 0.301*** 0.310*** 0.269*** 1      
(6) BM a 0.058*** 0.488*** 0.417*** 0.205*** 0.254*** 1     
(7) RDValue a -0.025 -0.108*** -0.093*** -0.127*** -0.081*** -0.178*** 1    
(8) RDInt a 0.02 -0.086*** -0.029 0.513*** 0.243*** -0.173*** -0.127*** 1   
(9) Size  -0.08*** -0.045** -0.044** -0.267*** -0.227*** -0.252*** 0.165*** -0.292*** 1  
(10) Beta a 0.035* 0.064*** 0.04** 0.044** 0.019 0.078*** -0.013 -0.016 0.071*** 1 
(11) Leverage a 0.096*** 0.223*** 0.157*** -0.072*** 0.042** 0.067*** 0.102*** -0.252*** 0.209*** 0.037** 
(12) IntSalesPerc a 0.032* 0.085*** 0.083*** -0.004 0.023 -0.031* -0.104*** -0.018 0.224*** 0.092*** 
(13) PastBeat 0.17*** 0.081*** 0.122*** 0.193*** 0.184*** -0.007 -0.107*** 0.234*** -0.047*** -0.02 
(14) ZeroBeat 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.17*** 0.279*** 0.336*** 0.111** * -0.072*** 0.277*** -0.163*** 0.02 
(15) BenchBeat 0.189*** 0.124*** 0.165*** 0.274*** 0.259*** 0.035* -0.125*** 0.292*** -0.11*** -0.008 
(16) Big4AR 0.009 0.06*** 0.062*** -0.02 -0.116*** -0.02 0.055**  -0.086*** 0.386*** 0.081*** 
(17) RepFreq 0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.023 -0.064*** -0.001 -0.048*** -0.074*** 0.278*** 0.042** 
(18) Capex a 0.054*** 0.519*** 0.442*** 0.143*** 0.216*** 0.522*** -0.045** -0.178*** 0.004 0.109*** 
(19) IMR -0.401*** -0.199*** -0.184*** -0.17*** -0.261*** -0 .133*** 0.063*** -0.056*** 0.212*** -0.072*** 
(20) Corruption 0.124*** 0.080*** 0.044** -0.017 0.074*** 0.125*** 0.09*** -0.141*** 0.002 -0.003 
(21) MrktDev -0.061*** -0.124*** -0.102*** -0.092*** -0.065*** - 0.139*** 0.087*** 0.023 -0.001 -0.009 
(22) Enforcement 0.054*** 0.045** 0.026 0.081*** 0.094*** -0.024 -0.043** 0.152*** -0.195*** -0.024 
(23) RDdivergence 0.102*** -0.064*** -0.083*** -0.016 0.032* -0.033* 0.058*** 0.08*** -0.087*** -0.002 
(24) InvProtection 0.002 -0.075*** -0.092*** -0.008 0.038** -0.06*** 0.08*** 0.126*** -0.224*** -0.051*** 
(25) AntiselfDeal -0.017 -0.007 -0.024 0.012 0.053*** -0.055*** 0.048*** 0.126*** -0.243*** -0.036** 
(26) CivCom 0.045** 0.02 0.037** 0.001 -0.046*** 0.063*** -0.063*** -0.123*** 0.256*** 0.044** 
 
(continued next page) 
 















  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(11) Leverage a 1          
(12) IntSalesPerc a 0.023 1         
(13) PastBeat -0.019 0.006 1        
(14) ZeroBeat -0.008 0.002 0.199*** 1       
(15) BenchBeat -0.02 0.001 0.873*** 0.532*** 1      
(16) Big4AR 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.009 0 0.008 1     
(17) RepFreq 0.151*** 0.118*** 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.159*** 1    
(18) Capex a 0.321*** 0.005 -0.012 0.025 0 0.059*** 0.076*** 1   
(19) IMR -0.216*** -0.068*** -0.374*** -0.257*** -0.44*** -0 .01 0.005 -0.064*** 1  
(20) Corruption 0.167*** -0.119*** -0.044** -0.01 -0.042** -0.063**  -0.058*** 0.172*** -0.274*** 1 
(21) MrktDev -0.136*** -0.061*** -0.036** -0.035** -0.048*** 0.031* -0.36*** -0.145*** 0.139*** -0.16*** 
(22) Enforcement -0.153*** -0.045** 0.029 0.022 0.038** -0.11*** -0.577*** -0.104*** -0.153*** -0.019 
(23) RDdivergence -0.048*** -0.015 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.08*** -0.423*** -0.109*** -0.249*** -0.051*** 
(24) InvProtection -0.141*** -0.084*** -0.006 0.009 0.005 -0.059*** -0.664*** -0.156*** -0.02 -0.148*** 
(25) AntiselfDeal -0.154*** -0.052*** 0.003 0.006 0.011 -0.099*** -0.665*** -0.136*** 0.024 -0.056*** 
(26) CivCom 0.167*** 0.08*** 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.13*** 0.683*** 0.143*** -0.09*** 0.073*** 
 
  (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(21) MrktDev 1      
(22) Enforcement 0.195*** 1     
(23) RDdivergence 0.368*** 0.263*** 1    
(24) InvProtection 0.546*** 0.491*** 0.756*** 1   
(25) AntiselfDeal 0.504*** 0.661*** 0.535*** 0.836*** 1  
(26) CivCom -0.498*** -0.638*** -0.394*** -0.813*** -0.952*** 1  
 
See Appendix II for variables’ definitions. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 























VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.089** -0.090** 
 (-3.10) (-2.99) (-2.58) (-2.69) (-2.17) (-2.08) 
Corruption 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 
 (2.74) (2.64) (2.86) (2.80) (1.02) (0.92) 
BM a 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.008 0.010* 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (4.53) (4.76) (1.54) (1.79) (8.16) (7.99) 
RDValue a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.94) (1.31) (0.50) (0.79) (1.73) (1.92) 
RDInt a 0.082*** 0.098*** 0.035 0.050 0.139*** 0.157*** 
 (2.94) (3.22) (0.99) (1.23) (4.81) (5.10) 
Size  -0.002** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.46) (-2.64) (-3.05) (-3.35) (-0.74) (-0.87) 
Beta a 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.78) (1.01) (2.48) (2.57) (-1.38) (-1.26) 
Leverage a 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (3.51) (3.53) (2.76) (2.77) (3.67) (3.74) 
IntSalesPerca 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (4.68) (4.57) (2.45) (2.55) (-0.22) (-0.13) 
PastBeat 0.018***  0.015***  0.019***  
 (7.13)  (3.66)  (8.20)  
ZeroBeat 0.035***  0.038***  0.033***  
 (13.46)  (5.38)  (6.52)  
BenchBeat  0.026***  0.024***  0.026*** 
  (10.22)  (8.02)  (10.20) 
Big4AR -0.007* -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015*** -0.014** 
 (-1.75) (-1.49) (-0.17) (-0.12) (-2.59) (-2.28) 
RepFreq 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 
 (1.57) (1.57) (2.61) (2.79) (0.66) (0.59) 
MrktDev 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.15) (0.17) (-1.03) (-1.18) (1.78) (1.71) 
Enforcement 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.96) (2.81) (2.59) (2.40) (3.13) (3.14) 
RDdivergence 0.021*** 0.021** 0.018* 0.019** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (2.62) (2.45) (1.94) (2.05) (3.14) (3.03) 
InvProtection -0.008 -0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.050** -0.055** 
 (-0.48) (-0.47) (0.39) (0.45) (-2.02) (-2.10) 
AntiselfDeal -0.044* -0.041* -0.033 -0.028 -0.062** -0.064** 
 (-1.88) (-1.66) (-1.31) (-1.10) (-2.22) (-2.08) 
CivCom -0.016 -0.014 -0.010 -0.006 -0.041* -0.043* 
 (-1.00) (-0.84) (-0.62) (-0.38) (-1.86) (-1.80) 
Industry f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 3,186 3,186 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 
Pseudo  
R-squared 
0.398 0.367 0.322 0.287 0.571 0.541 
Mean VIF 3.40 3.48 3.32 3.39 3.81 3.90 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors clustered by country. 
a Variables winsorised by year at 1% and 99%. See Appendix II for variables’ definitions. t-statistics in brackets. 
Coefficients for Corruption in model 3 and 5 are different at 5% level (Wald chi-squared = 3.99). 
















Table 7 – Development costs and future benefits  





NI NI2 NI NI2 NI NI2 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant 1.181* 1.015** 1.866** 1.828** 1.380** 1.198** 
 (1.81) (2.14) (2.12) (2.66) (2.14) (2.17) 
RDCap a  9.958*** 9.149*** 11.608*** 8.793** 5.672*** 6.297* 















RDExp a 2.696** 2.820** 0.718 0.898 5.443** 5.353*** 















CAP -0.055 -0.000 -0.070 -0.018 -0.014 0.027 
 (-0.85) (-0.01) (-0.92) (-0.29) (-0.19) (0.46) 
Size  0.046*** 0.047*** 0.026 0.014 0.055** 0.065** 
 (3.03) (3.75) (0.93) (0.47) (2.54) (2.83) 
Leverage a 0.116* 0.031 0.118 0.033 0.128*** 0.031 
 (1.83) (0.56) (1.50) (0.47) (3.17) (0.65) 
IntSalesPerca 0.001 0.001 0.005** 0.005** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (1.30) (0.89) (2.45) (2.74) (-3.95) (-5.13) 
Big4AR 0.108 0.104 -0.016 0.040 0.270* 0.198 
 (1.37) (1.61) (-0.32) (0.87) (1.74) (1.50) 
RepFreq -0.103** -0.115*** -0.091 -0.134*** -0.121*** -0.105*** 
 (-2.45) (-3.48) (-1.62) (-2.95) (-3.37) (-2.88) 
Capex a 4.317*** 3.104*** 4.297*** 3.348*** 3.813*** 2.304*** 
 (6.13) (7.92) (5.00) (5.81) (5.85) (5.21) 
IMR -0.668*** -0.639*** -0.751*** -0.747*** -0.578*** - 0.539*** 
 (-4.77) (-5.52) (-5.19) (-6.51) (-3.70) (-3.41) 
Corruption -0.072*** -0.079*** -0.102*** -0.121*** -0.036 -0.035 
 (-2.89) (-4.38) (-3.33) (-5.14) (-1.10) (-1.16) 
MrktDev 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* -0.001* -0.000 
 (0.06) (1.52) (1.05) (2.03) (-1.96) (-0.38) 
Enforcement -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015** 
 (-0.54) (-1.50) (-0.25) (-1.26) (-1.51) (-2.49) 
RDdivergence -0.342 -0.445* -0.281 -0.376 -0.499* -0.583*** 
 (-1.31) (-1.96) (-0.93) (-1.36) (-1.95) (-3.13) 
InvProtection -0.474 -0.420 -0.576 -0.531 -0.057 -0.100 
 (-1.17) (-1.09) (-1.31) (-1.27) (-0.16) (-0.31) 
AntiselfDeal 1.086 1.308** 0.713 1.148 1.590* 1.572*** 
 (1.32) (2.13) (0.74) (1.40) (1.85) (3.16) 
CivCom 0.158 0.365 -0.066 0.303 0.426 0.423 
 (0.34) (1.06) (-0.12) (0.65) (0.89) (1.44) 
Industry f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year f.e. Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 3,186 3,186 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 
Adj. R-squared 0.454 0.385 0.396 0.334 0.561 0.482 
Mean VIF 5.18 5.18 5.19 5.19 5.63 5.63 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors clustered by country. 
a Variables winsorised by year at 1% and 99%. See Appendix II for variables’ definitions. t-statistics in brackets. 
Coefficients for RDCap*Corruption in model 9 and 11 are different at 5% level (Wald = 4.83). 

















Table 8 – Market performance of capitalizers and expensers across countries with low 
and high corruption 
 
 
Average abnormal returns  
Corruption 
 
Low High Comparison t-stat 
Panel A: 1-year abnormal returns 








Comparison 0.021 -0.022 
  
t-stat -1.085 0.608 
  
Panel B: 5-year abnormal returns 








Comparison 0.394*** -0.135 
  
t-stat 4.293 1.229 
  
Number of observations in brackets. Countries with high (low) corruption are defined as those countries of 
which corruption score is above (below) the median corruption score of all countries in our sample in that year. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% respectively. Differences in mean returns are tested with a t-
test. 
  
